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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Deregulation Debate 
The economic and political environment of the 1970^ 8 fostered a 
growing desire to reduce the involvement of government in the 
marketplace. This trend towards the removal of government 
interference was especially keen in the financial services industry. 
The collection of regulations and restrictions placed on certain 
participants in the industry after the turbulent 1930^s was becoming a 
competitive obstacle for those firms subject to them. 
One aspect of the financial services deregulation debate focuses 
on the appropriateness of relaxing interstate banking restrictions. 
Numerous researchers, including Benston, Godfrey, Gorinson, Horvitz, 
and Sinkey, have addressed issues related to geographic deregulation 
(2,16,17,19,40). One issue discussed concerns the relevant scope of 
deregulation - regional relaxation or full interstate banking (36). 
Another point of contention is the effect such deregulation would have 
on the structuré, conduct, and performance of the banking industry. 
While these are important concerns, there is an additional factor 
which to date has not been adequately considered. That is, what 
effect will relaxation of interstate restrictions have on the safety 
and soundness of the banking industry? Furthermore, what implications 
will the altered level of safety have on the role of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)7 
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B. Current Geographic Restrictions 
The current geographic restrictions on bank branching resulted 
form the McFadden Act of 1927. This Act, coupled with the Banking Act 
of 1935, set state lines as boundaries and relegated to the state the 
issue of branching within a state. By defining a branch as, "any place 
of business...at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money 
lent", the McFadden Act limited the opportunities for making loans or 
taking deposits across state lines (17, p. 228). 
Large banks have been relatively successful at circumventing the 
lending restrictions implied in this Act. Working through facilities 
known as loan production offices, these institutions establish a 
physical presence in various markets throughout the country. The loan 
production office then allows the non-domiciled bank to service a much 
wider clientele. They are thus able to obtain loan customers from a 
national market. 
Horvitz (19), however, suggests that we do not observe the same 
utilization of loan production offices by smaller institutions. 
Furthermore, he asserts that the majority of small and medium-sized 
banks" loan customers are from the local market. Pierson notes that, 
"branching restrictions prohibit banks from operating on a nationwide 
basis, thus limiting their ability to compete effectively outside their 
base operating area" (32, p. 471). It seems then, that lack of an 
effective means for attracting non-local customers has resulted in 
smaller financial institutions facing a binding constraint from the 
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Act's geographic restrictions. 
C. The Link Between Deregulation and Safety 
The link between geographic deregulation and bank safety results 
from banks now undertaking new activities which alter their 
performance. In attempting to establish this link, it seems that two 
contentions must be supported. 
First, it needs to be shown that geographic regions are somehow 
different. That is, that states or groups of states are heterogeneous, 
thus allowing banks access to new activities. A new activity might 
simply be characterized as a loan market where customers have a 
different default pattern from customers in the current market. 
Second, it must be shown that these heterogeneous characteristics have 
an affect on bank safety. Once these two arguments are established, 
the analysis can proceed. 
The first contention is supported by recent studies that 
demonstrate that various states or groups of states make up relatively 
distinct economic regions in this country (5,6,7,8,30,42). Syron (42) 
suggests that while the entire country has an economic business cycle, 
so too, various areas may experience regional economic cycles. 
Furthermore, he argues that these regional cycles are becoming less, 
rather than more, similar. Browne (5) attributes much of these 
variations in regional economic cycles to the industrial mix which 
4 
compose various regions. la addition, she suggests that these regional 
cycles are not perfectly correlated with either the national economy or 
other regions. Given that these studies establish the existence of 
heterogeneous regions with unique business cycles, it must now be 
demonstrated that these local economic cycles influence bank 
performance. 
Various studies can be cited to support this argument. Notably, 
Meyer and Pifer (29) in attempting to model bank failure identify local 
economic conditions as an important explanatory variable. Also, a 
study by Spong and Hoeing states that "economic conditions have been 
the main factor in the overall health of the banking industry and have 
also been an important factor in loan quality changes at the individual 
bank level" (41, p. 23). Finally, Kreps and Wacht suggest that the 
"soundness of banks...depends much more on conditions existing in the 
economic environment in which the bank exists and operates than on the 
regulation of their internal operations" (22, p. 605). 
Thus, it seems that the factors which influence loan performance 
(i.e., default rates) are tied to the regional economic business 
cycles. Furthermore, to the extent that regional cycles are 
uncorrelated, default rates on loans should not be perfectly correlated 
among banks in different regions. Therefore, geographical deregulation 
should provide an opportunity for banks to effectively change their 
portfolios. This may in turn influence their performance and ultimate 
safety. 
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D. Risk From the Baaks" Perspective 
It seems relatively straightforward that risk from a bank'^ s 
perspective can be altered with a relaxation of lending restrictions. 
Notably, this conclusion can be reached from an elementary application 
of portfolio theory. 
Portfolio theory demonstrates that when the returns on assets are 
not perfectly positively correlated, then holding combinations of the 
assets can lead to less variability in returns than could be achieved 
by holding any asset separately (27). Thus, by using the variance in 
asset returns as a measure of risk, the theory suggests that investors 
can achieve a less risky position by diversifying their portfolio. 
This implies that if the supposition of lack of perfect correlation 
among loan default rates is correct, then banks could achieve a lower 
risk position (i.e., less variance in returns) by holding a portfolio 
of loans to a number of economic regions than by simply lending to one 
area. 
This line of rêàâôulûg Is supported by Bsnston and Marlin who 
note, "...small banks tend to concentrate their loans over a compact 
geographical area, with the consequence that adverse economic 
conditions in the area may have a more serious impact on them than more 
widely diversified banks" (3, p. 36). Hence, restrictions on 
interstate lending may be increasing the risk exposure of banks. 
Benston argues, "it seems clear that the legal prohibition against 
banks diversifying their location—and consequently their assets and 
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liabilities--impairs their ability to survive a local economic crisis" 
(2» p« 32)« 
E. Risk From Society's Perspective 
The conclusion derived from the application of portfolio theory 
rests on the premise that variability in returns is the appropriate 
measure of risk. While this might be adequate from the stockholders' 
standpoint, the same may not be true from society's perspective. 
Society, as represented by the FDIC, is primarily concerned about the 
downside vulnerability of a portfolio's worth. This notion of risk is 
consistent with one suggested by Domar and Husgrave (12). It argues 
that upward gains cannot be considered risky. Rather, it is the 
possibility of relatively low portfolio values which might invoke the 
need for FDIC redemption of the bank's liabilities. 
Granted, if the bank's portfolio is a combination of assets with 
normally distributed returns, then the two notions of risk are 
compatible. That is, a reduction in variance implies that the chances 
for downside losses, as well as upward gains, are reduced. However, if 
the returns are not normally distributed, this compatibility is not as 
apparent. (See the Appendix for an example where the two notions are 
not completely compatible with each other.) Thus, portfolio theory in 
a mean-variance context may not provide the necessary information 
concerning the changes in social risk that potentially result from a 
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relaxation of lending restrictions. 
A second measure of risk from society's perspective is the 
necessary size of an Insurance fund to protect the banking system. The 
issue Is whether geographical deregulation can reduce the necessary 
size of the fund. It might be argued that the FDIC already pools the 
risk of the banks and therefore a reshuffling of assets between banks 
would have no effect on the appropriate fund size. Whether this claim 
can be substantiated needs to be addressed. 
F. Statement of Objective 
The purpose of this research project then is to Investigate some 
of the implications of removing geographical lending restrictions from 
banks. The implications to be considered are how such deregulation 
might affect individual bank safety, industry risk exposure, and the 
necessary Insurance fund. Specifically, how will deregulation affect 
the probability of Individual and multiple bank failures and how will 
it affect the expected payout by the FDIC in the event of a failure. 
G. Review of the Literature 
The literature germane to this study can be grouped under three 
categories. First, there are articles which deal with the effect of 
bank branching on deposit variability and bank safety. Second, there 
are studies that investigate the effect of expanded asset choices on 
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the probability of failure. Third, there are articles on the role and 
potential liability of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
1. Expanded liabilities 
A 1968 article by Wacht (44) sets the tone for most of the 
research on the affect of increased branching on deposit expansion and 
variability. Wacht suggests that branching can lead to reduction in 
the variability of deposit outflows and thus a reduction in the 
riskiness of the bank. He invokes portfolio theory as a justification 
for his conclusion. His application of the theory argues that deposit 
outflows from different branches will offset one another, thus reducing 
the overall variability of the flows. 
Lauch and Murphy (25) test Wacht's hypothesis. Their results 
suggest that, in fact, the variability of deposit flows is reduced by 
branching away from the base area. Thus, expanded branching can reduce 
the riskiness associated with deposit variability. 
The inherent weakness with applying the results of these articles 
to the current issue is that it would confuse liquidity problems with 
solvency problems. Liquidity problems arise when a large number of 
depositors unexpectedly seek to withdraw their funds from a particular 
bank at the same time. The bank may temporarily have a shortage of 
liquid reserves to meet these unpredicted withdrawals. These studies 
show that branching can reduce the uncertainty associated with deposit 
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outflows and thus reduce the chances for such a liquidity crisis. 
However, solvency problems result from a deterioration of the 
underlying assets which support the deposit base. Bank safety 
ultimately rests on this support. A reduction in deposit variability 
will not affect this deterioration and thus will not affect bank 
solvency.^  
2. Expanded assets 
The issue of expanded asset choices on individual bank safety has 
been addressed by Blair and Heggestad (4). Using a mean-variance 
framework, they applied the Roy's Safety-First model (34). In their 
application, Chebyshev's Inequality is utilized to determine the upper 
bound on the probability of bank failure. 
Note first that Chebyshev's Inequality (24) states: 
Pr (TT < IT -k<r ) < l/kf (1.1) 
where: IT is a random variable, 
TT is the expected value of TT, 
J" is the standard deviation of TT , 
k is a positive constant. 
There is an exception to this statement. To the extent that a 
reduction in deposit variability reduces the need for a bank to 
liquidate assets in an imperfect secondary market, bankruptcy potential 
may be reduced. 
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If oC Is then defined as 
o( " TT- kf , (1.2) 
then solving for k yields 
k« TT (1.3) 
Substituting (1.2) and (1*3) into (1.1) produces 
Equation (1.4) corresponds with Blair and Heggestad's equation 1 (4, 
p. 90). Now, if "rt* is allowed to represent the return on the bank's 
portfolio and =( to represent the lowest value "H" can take and still 
allow the bank to remain solvent, certain conclusions can be drawn. 
Specifically, TT < •< would represent a situation where the portfolio had 
generated such a negative return that all the capital was eroded. This 
situation implies bankruptcy. 
By utilizing a mean-standard deviation diagram, a graphical 
representation of the probability suggested in equation (1.4) is 
possible (see Diagram 1). Allow AB to represent the available 
portfolio lôcuâ, àûu allow peint D to hs the portfolio selected by the 
bank. Observe, that a ray drawn from oC to D has a slope equal to 
(ir- "()/f. Furthermore, note that this slope is equal to k where k 
was defined in equation (1.3). Recall that the probabiltiy that TT< ^  
is less than or equal to 1/k^. Thus, this probability is represented 
by the square of the reciprocal of the slope of a ray from o( to D (4, 
p. 90). In addition, as k increases, (i.e., the slope gets steeper), 
the probability that "n"< oC , l/k^ , declines. That is, a steeper ray 
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TT 
c< • 
Diagram 1. Restricted Portfolio Locus 
implies a lower upper bound on the probability of failure. 
Expanded asset choices may change the position of the investment 
opportunity locus. Specifically, if change occurs, it will make the 
locus more desirable. Increasing desirability implies that for any 
given variance, the attainable expected return on the efficient portion 
of the locus will be greater. Diagram 2 includes the former portfolio 
locus bounded by points A and B, and the new locus bounded by points K 
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and C. 
TT 
TT 
Diagram 2. Expanded Portfolio Locus 
From Diagram 2, it is evident that what happens to the probability 
of failure partially depends on where the bank optimizes after asset 
restrictions have been eliminated. If the bank selects a portfolio 
between points E and F, the ray from o( to the new portfolio will be 
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steeper. Recall, this implies a lower upper bound on the probability 
of failure. If instead, the bank selects a portfolio between F and C, 
the upper bound on the probability of failure will increase. 
Therefore, Blair and Heggestad suggest that whether portfolio 
restrictions are detrimental to the safety of individual banks is 
ambiguous. 
Koehn and Santamero (21) extend the work of Blair and Heggestad. 
Rather than focusing on asset restrictions and individual bank safety, 
they attempt to analyze the affect of bank capital regulations and 
industry-wide risk. In so doing, they look at how a changing 
investment locus affects the probability of failure. Like Blair and 
Heggestad, Koehn and Santamero use a mean-variance framework. 
Following the work of Merton (28), they derive an efficient investment 
frontier subject to a capital constraint. Then, they demonstrate that 
the imposition of stricter capital constraints will affect the 
available efficient investment frontier. Notably, it will lead the 
available fcoatier to shift dora, reducing the desirability of the 
choices. As with Blair and Heggestad, whether risk is increased or 
decreased will depend on the bank's re-optimization following the 
change in constraints. Koehn and Santamero demonstrate that this will 
depend on the relative risk aversion of the individual banks and 
therefore, aggregation is not feasible. 
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The value of the approach used In both of these studies is open to 
criticism. Specifically, Chebyshev's Inequality gives only the upper 
bound on the probability of failure. Thus, when making comparisons of 
the impact of asset expansion on risk, the results allow the researcher 
to compare only changes in the upper bounds. The actual probability of 
failure may have moved in the opposite direction. Furthermore, this 
approach gives no insights into the potential effect of relaxation of 
regulations on the solvency of the FDIC. This framework addresses only 
the probability of failure and not the expected value of payout by the 
FDIC. 
3. The role of the FDIC 
Various articles have expounded on the goals of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (2,13,14,20,39,45,46). They suggest that 
the goals might include: the protection of the money supply, the 
protection of the payments mechanism, the protection of small 
depositors, and the protection of small institutions. While each of 
the studies emphasize different aspects of the role of the FDIC, all 
tend to agree with former FDIC chairman Frank Willie, that, "in the 
final analysis, the task is to assure confidence in the nation's 
banking system" (32, p. 374). The loss of this confidence potentially 
leads to bank runs and the undesirable social loss that results from 
widespread bank failure (11). 
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One method of maintaining this confidence is to guarantee that if 
a bank fails, deposits will be redeemed by the insuring agency. 
Specifically, the public must be confident that there are adequate 
reserves to support such a guarantee (11). A variety of approaches to 
defining an adequate fund may be utilized. One possibility is for the 
agency to hold a fund equal to the total potential losses that could be 
incurred by the insuring agency. Another option is for them to hold a 
fund equal to some fraction of potential losses. An intermediate 
criteria would be to hold an actuarially sound fund. That is, a fund 
equal to the expected value of losses. 
The current FDIC fund is maintained by an assessment levied on 
banks. The law requires that this assessment be based on the total 
deposits of the insured institution. While there is widespread debate 
over the appropriateness of such a fixed-rate pricing method, this is 
not a concern of this study. Rather, the issue is whether a relaxation 
of lending restrictions could potentially change the expected FDIC 
payout. Any change would imply a corresponding movement in the risk 
exposure of the banking system. Also, if it is possible to reduce the 
appropriate size of the fund while maintaining the safety of the 
system, then those resources that are saved could potentially be 
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2 diverted to more productive uses. This desire for efforts to reduce 
the necessary size of the fund is strongly advocated by Scott and Mayer 
(37). In addition, Gibson notes, "the goal of having it (the FDIC) 
attain its goals with the fewest resources would be disputed by few" 
(14, p. 1576). 
Sharpe (38) provides some insights into the nature of the FDlC's 
potential liability. Employing a complete market, state-preference 
approach, Sharpe indicates that the expected value of the FDIC 
liability is a function of the states of the world in which bankruptcy 
occurs and the loss in each of those states. This same notion can be 
applied to a probabilistic framework as will be shown in Chapter 2. 
H. Summary 
This chapter has argued that small banks seem to be constrained by 
the lending restrictions implied in the McFadden Act. Furthermore, it 
has suggested that removal of these barriers would provide these 
institutions with new opportunities which will affect their 
^he FDIC currently invests most of its assets in short term 
government securities. If banks could retain a portion of those funds 
that they currently pay to the FDIC in the form of premiums, they could 
select the most productive use for these resources. While they may 
select an investment comparable to that of the FDIC, it is not obvious 
that this would be their choice. Rather, they would likely invest in 
assets with the greatest risk-adjusted rate of return. Thus, there is 
potential that these resources could be used more efficiently than they 
are now. 
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performance. It has argued that the usual notion of risk 
(i.e., variance) might not be appropriate when addressing issues of 
changes in risk from a societal perspective. Finally, it has shown 
that the current literature does not address the issue adequately. 
Therefore, in Chapter 2, a framework will be developed within 
which to analyze the impact of risk changes that may result from 
relaxation of geographic lending restrictions. Chapter 3 will use this 
model in a simulation exercise. Finally, Chapter 4 will discuss the 
implications that follow from the exercise. 
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II. THE MODEL 
A. Introduction 
The move to interstate banking can be accomplished in various 
ways. Following the relaxation of restrictions, banks may more 
actively lend directly to other regions. That is, banks may find it 
advantageous to open new branches in various sections of the country in 
order to expand the geographical scope of their loan portfolio. 
However, the current lack of extensive utilization of loan production 
offices by medium- and small-sized banks might suggest this de novo 
method of geographic expansion is prohibitively costly. A more likely 
approach to portfolio diversification would be through the merger of 
already existing banks in different regions of the country. This could 
provide the immediate result of portfolio diversification without the 
cost of recruiting local expertise to manage the new branch. 
Regardless of the method selected, the survey of the literature 
suggests that in order to determine the probability of bank failure and 
to compute th^  expected value of the FDIC payout, before and after 
deregulation, it is necessary to base the analysis on more than the 
traditional mean-variance approach. In fact. Lane and Golen (23) 
suggest that under certain circumstances, it may be appropriate to 
specify a joint probability distribution on all of the bank's 
activities, then to compute the desired values from an analysis of this 
distribution. However, with respect to an investigation of the risk 
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implications of interstate bank deregulation, a slightly less 
complicated procedure can be used. 
B. Risk Identification 
When considering a move to interstate banking, default loss is the 
primary type of bank risk that will be affected. Analysis of this will 
require a comparison of the default potential within a bank's portfolio 
before and after expansion across regional boundaries. Coupled with 
this default potential is the necessity to expend resources attempting 
to collect on these assets. These collection costs should be Included 
in an analysis of the potential for bankruptcy. 
The risk of fluctuating asset values due to interest rate changes 
should not be affected directly by this geographical deregulation. 
This risk, known as interest rate risk, results from the banks' 
mismatching of asset and liability maturity lengths. There is no a 
priori reason to believe that management's policies with respect to 
asset and liability mismatching will change simply because a new 
variety of assets is available. Therefore, while it is acknowledged 
that such mismatching can and does play an important role in the 
solvency of a bank, it should not be influenced by the relaxation of 
geographical restrictions. 
Thus, when specifying a distribution for the study of bankruptcy 
potential and FDIC payout values, the analysis will focus on the 
potential that earnings on assets will be less than the contractual 
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return. Hence, the bank encounters difficulty if assets fall in value 
due to partial or complete default of interest and principle and/or if 
it expends too many resources attempting to collect on its assets. 
C. Model Specification 
1. Balance sheet identities 
For purposes of the analysis, assume there exist two banks, H and 
T. These banks are located in different regions, 1 and 2. For 
simplicity, assume the only asset which either bank holds are loans.^ 
These may be made to either region 1 or region 2. From these 
assumptions, the following relationships can be stated for a 
representative bank. 
.ZL^t = A^t j"H,T (2.1) 
where: is the dollar value of loans to region i by 
bank j at the beginning of period t and 
is the total asset value of bank j at the 
beginning of period t. 
In addition, due to the balance sheet identity, given an initial 
In reality, banks hold other assets, including reserves and 
government securities. To the extent that these maintain their value, 
they would be available to payoff depositors before capital is eroded. 
This can be implicitly included in tiie model by having the capital 
buffer be larger than it is in reality. 
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stockholder iavestoeat, C^, and a given initial deposit base, D^, the 
bank is able to acquire assets such that, 
- D^t + C^t* (2.2) 
It is then possible to write capital at the end of the period, 
^t+1' ^ function of asset values at the end of the period, 
cVl - *\+l - "'tfl (2-3) 
where: is capital at the end of the period for bank j ,  
is the value of assets at the end of the period 
held by bank j, and 
is the dollar value of deposits at the end 
of the period held by bank j. 
Observe, that since loans to a region are considered risky, (i.e., they 
have default potential), the sum of loan values at the end of the 
period, A^^^^, is a random variable. Also, deposits at the end of the 
period, may fluctuate. The model assumes that deposits do act 
2 fall but can increase. Specifically, it is important to realize that 
any collection expense in excess of revenue from assets must be 
financed by either attraction of new deposits or new capital. A stock 
^This allows attention to be focused on default problems and 
not on problems caused by asset liquidation in imperfect secondary 
markets brought on by a bank run. 
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offering would expose the bank to careful scrutiny by both investors 
and regulatory agencies. Since this is likely to be undesirable from 
the bank's standpoint, deposit expansion seems a more desirable source 
of funds. Note, that since depositors are Insured, they have little 
incentive to assess the risk exposure of the bank. Thus, the bank 
acquires deposits, a liability, and also cash, an asset. However, the 
model assumes the cash is immediately expended in attempts to collect 
on the loans. This highlights the possibility that FDlC-redeemable 
liabilities could grow rapidly in the final days of the bank as it 
attempts to collect on its assets. Recent experience with banks' use 
of brokered funds just prior to collapse confirms this possibility. 
Therefore, since equation 2.3 indicates that capital at the end of the 
period is a function of two random variables, it too is a random 
variable. 
2. Utilizing a distribution on capital 
The FDIC beeomes flaaacially involved if the value of capital at 
the end of the period is negative. That is, only if the bank's assets 
fall sufficiently in value and/or the bank expends excessive amounts of 
resources attempting to collect on its assets does it become necessary 
for the FDIC to redeem part or all of the banks liabilities. 
Specifically, the FDIC will have to redeem all insured liabilities in 
excess of asset values at the end of the period. For purposes of the 
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analysis, assume that all liabilities are insured. Hence, it is 
possible to find the probability that the FDIC will have to payoff 
depositors at a representative bank by evaluating the probability that 
is negative. This is given by the definite integral 
o 
(2.4) 
—CO 
Therefore, by specifying a distribution on end-of-the-perlod capital, 
the probability of capital being negative (i.e., the firm is bankrupt) 
can be found. Note, the integral allows capital to go to -«> because, 
as previously suggested, may grow rapidly as the bank attempts to 
remain solvent. 
3. Utilizing a distribution on losses 
Suppose, however, that instead of specifying a distribution on 
capital, a distribution on loan losses were characterized. This may be 
advantageous because it Is loan losses that lead to capital erosion. 
Furthermore, this method of specification will allow explicit analysis 
of the relationship of losses between regions. 
3 
In reality, only $100,000 per account is insured. While this 
assumption will affect the size of the payout, it should not affect the 
qualitative results of the model. Also note, the study is looking 
primarily at small- and medium-sized banks which have fewer uninsured 
deposits. 
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Loan losses should be defined in a very broad sense in order to 
incorporate all of the variability reflected in terminal capital. 
Specifically, loan losses include not only defaults but also collection 
expenses. Thus, losses can exceed the original value of the loan. 
Recall from equation 2.3, that it is possible to write capital at 
the end of the period as 
^\+l " ^\+l ' "^^+1* (2.3) 
Furthermore, it is possible to specify that asset values at the end of 
the period as 
<2.5) 
where: and are as previously defined, 
is the contractual return on L^, and 
Dl^ is the default loss on loans to region i. 
Note, the maximum value assets can take is A*, where 
A* » &L^^(l+r^^). (2.6) 
Likewise, the value of deposits at the end of the period, , is 
assumed to be equal to 
. J '• 
"••«•l • + |,"i <2-') 
where Cl^ are the collection costs for loans to region 1, 
Finally, loan losses, 1^, can be specified to equal 
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1^ - Dlj + Clj. (2.8) 
Then, substituting 2.6 into 2.5, and 2.5 and 2.7 into 2.3 yields 
- A* - EDl^ - (D\+%C1^). (2.9) 
Rearranging terms, 
C^t+i " A* - - (I Dl^+ICl^). (2.10) 
Substituting 2.8 into 2.10 gives, 
. A* - - li -Ig. (2.11) 
Thus, by utilizing this relationship, it will be possible to find from 
a distribution on loan losses the probability of a representative bank 
failing and the expected FDIC payout. 
Given the lack of accurate data on individual bank loan losses and 
collection expenses with which to determine the actual distribution, 
the analysis requires that an assumption be made about the nature of 
the distribution. There are certain characteristics that are desirable 
for an assumed probability distribution on loan losses. Among these 
are a minimum value of zero for the distribution and a heavy weighting 
of probability on low values of losses, yet a possibility of high loss 
values. Furthermore, in order to utilize the distribution, it should 
be reasonably easy to manipulate. One such distribution is a truncated 
normal. Besides having a minimum value of zero and a high probability 
of low values, the truncated normal is fully defined by a few 
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parameters. Thus, by specifying that Loan losses between regions are 
distributed as a truncated joint normal, the necessary analysis should 
be both realistic and tractable. 
In order to find the probability of a payout by the FDIC, the 
distribution needs to be integrated over the region where capital is 
negative. From equation 2.11, this results when the sum of loan losses 
4r 'ft 
Is greater than A -D^. A -D^ represents the maximum value capital can 
take at the end of the period. Note, if losses are zero, equation 2.11 
indicates that would equal A*-D^. remains positive as long 
as losses are less than this maximum capital value. 
Graphically, in 1^^, 1^ space, negative capital is represented by 
the area outside the buffer zone (see Diagram 3). This zone is 
bounded by a line that represents combinations of losses, 1^ + 1^, 
which just equal the maximum value capital can take at the end of the 
period. That is, this line represents loss combinations such that 
is equal to zero. 
With losses defined to be distributed as a truncated bivariate 
normal, the probability of failure, and hence a payout, for a 
representative bank, is found by evaluating the definite Integral 
where g(lj^l2) is a density function for a 
truncated bivariate normal distribution. 
It Is possible to compute the expected value of the FDIC payout by 
» 00 
(2.12) 
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A-D 
c 
1 
Diagram 3. Loan Loss Space 
evaluating the definite integral 
"f a> J /(0)g(l^lj,)dl^dl2 + J'/(l^+l2-A*+D^)g(l^l2)dl^dl2. (2.13) 
Note, since the FDIC redeems liabilities only if they are in excess of 
those redeemable by asset liquidation, the payout is zero when the sum 
of losses is less than or equal to the buffer, and D^^^- when 
losses exceed the buffer. From equation 2.3, this non-zero payment is 
simply However, from equation 2.11, this can be represented by 
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the term l^+l2"A +D^. Thus, the procedure integrates over the entire 
outcome space and multiplies each probability by the payout for that 
outcome. 
4. Deriving the truncated bivarlate normal distribution 
It is possible to derive the desired truncated distribution from a 
full bivarlate normal distribution in the following manner. Let and 
*2 be variables with a bivarlate normal distribution. Let Ij^ and Ig be 
variables distributed as a truncated bivarlate normal, where the 
truncation results in 1^ and Ig having positive probability only in the 
positive quadrant. To obtain the distribution for 1^ and I2 from the 
distribution on Xj^ and Xg, it is necessary to multiply the probability 
in the positive quadrant of x^ and X2 by a scalar. This scalar is 
equal to the reciprocal of the probability in the positive quadrant. 
This will allow the total probability of 1^12 combinations to equal 1. 
Symbolically, this procedure can be shown In the following manner. 
Let the probability density function on x^ and X2 be equal to 
f(x^, X2), such that, 
f(xj^, Xj) - Ue'^ (2.14) 
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and, 
T = 
2(l-p2) 
2 X 
' 
1 
^
 
I 
*2- "X2 *2- "X2 
- 2p 4 
<R-L 1 J L 1 - L 2 J X 
-I 2 
Then, the probability in the positive quadrant is equal to the definite 
integral 
«0 • 
// 
o o 
f(tj^, X2 ) dx^dx2* (2.15) 
The scalar needed to obtain the density function on 1^ and I2 is equal 
to the reciprocal of 2.15. Let this scalar be gamma (f). Then, the 
density function on 1^^ and I2 is 
sdi» I2)- c y)f(x,, X,) 1' ^ 2' (2 .16)  
where: g(l^, I2) is the density function for Ij^ & I2, 
Ij^, I2 > 0, and 
li - x^. 
5. Parameter specification 
Recall, equation 2.1 defined the total portfolio in terms of the 
sum of the various assets. 
It is also possible to define variables which allow discussion of the 
banks' portfolio In terms of the proportion of each asset in the 
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portfolio. Let be the proportion of assets Invested in loans to 
region 2 by bank j, such that, 
f aJ. (2.17) 
Solving for yields 
= Q^A^. (2.18) 
Furthermore, let (1-Q^) be the proportion of loans by bank j to region 
1. 
(I-QJ) = f A\ (2.19) 
so that, 
= (I-qJ)aJ. (2.20) 
Then, for purposes of analysis if it is specified that the mean of 
losses is proportional to the amount of loans to the region, and the 
standard deviation of losses is proportional to the amount of that type 
of loans, it is possible to define the following relationships. 
"l = 01^1 = 0i(l-Q)A (2.21) 
where Jo Is the sxpsctsd value of losses per dollar of loans to region 
1, and 
®1 ' ®1^1 " (2.22) 
where 9 is the standard deviation of losses per dollar of loans to 
region 1. 
Similarly, 
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(2.23) 
and, 
" &2^2 * G2QA. (2.24) 
Thus, once 0 and B are given and the volume of loans to a region 
specified, the determination of the mean and standard deviation of 
losses on the assets in the portfolio can be completed. Theoretically, 
these can then be used in the density function for losses in equation 
2.12 and 2.13 to compute the desired probabilities and payouts. 
However, note from equation 2.16 that the density function on 
losses is derived from the truncation of a bivariate normal 
distribution on x and x,. This truncation occurs such that all 1 2 
probability rests in the positive quadrant. Thus, it is possible to 
write the mean and standard deviation of losses as 
O  P  
Also, the correlation of losses between regions can be written as 
to «7 
xj)(y)f(x,x,)dx,dx 
o « 
(2.25) 
and. 
œ *e 
//(x,-u, ) ( x n-u, )(y)f(x,x,)dx,dx, 
V, . = U ^ h ^ h ^ ^ ^ ^ (2.27) 
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Observe that equations 2.25 thru 2.27 explicitly describe the mean and 
standard deviation of losses In each region and the correlation between 
regions as functions of the underlying means, standard deviations and 
correlation of the x's which characterize the density function f(Xj^x2). 
Thus, once equations 2.21 thru 2.24 are used to specify the means and 
standard deviations of losses, and a correlation of losses is 
established, they implicitly suggest the underlying means, standard 
deviations, and correlation of the x s which would be necessary to 
generate the appropriate truncated distribution. Since substitution of 
2.16 into 2.12 implies that calculation of the desired probabilities 
requires knowledge of the means, standard deviations, and correlation 
of the x's, 2.25 thru 2.27 would need to be simultaneously solved to 
reveal these values. However, given the complexity of the functions, 
explicit equations for the mean and standard deviation of each x and 
their correlation as functions of the mean and standard deviation of 
losses and their correlation are not readily discernible. Therefore, a 
comparable procedure needs to be employed. Namely, rather than 
specifying p, and using Jf and 0 to compute u. and (C respectively, 
12 
suppose that the mean and standard deviation of x were first 
characterized. 
As previously defined, x is a variable with a full normal 
distribution which can be truncated to derive the distribution on loan 
losses to a region. Given this, it is possible to scale the x variable 
such that it represents a distribution from which a distribution on 
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losses per dollar of loans could be derived. Specifically, since j6 is 
the expected value of losses per dollar of loans, let A be the mean of 
the scaled distribution needed to generate Jd, Furthermore, just as 6 
is the standard deviation of losses per dollar of loans, let k be the 
standard deviation of the scaled distribution needed to generate 6. 
This A >  k combination will then characterize a distribution which can 
be truncated to derive the distribution on losses per dollar of loans. 
Furthermore, given these definitions, it is possible to specify that 
the mean of x is equal to A times the amount of loans to the region and 
the standard deviation of x is equal to k times the amount of loans to 
a region. Symbolically, 
Therefore, once the A's and k's have been specified, and the 
correlation of the x's given, it is possible to determine the 
probability density function for 1^1^ combinations (i.e., losses on the 
actual portfolio) from a distribution on x^ and X2. These can then be 
used to compute the post-deregulation probability of failure and 
expected payout by the FDIC for a representative bank. 
(2.28) 
and 
(2.29) 
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6. Complete model specification 
Equations 2.18 and 2.20 describing loans to a region as a 
proportion of total portfolio size can now be substituted into 
equations 2.28 and 2.29. The resulting equations for the means and 
standard deviations of the x s can then be used in the truncated 
blvariate normal density function in equation 2.16. if this density 
function is then substituted into equations 2.12 and 2.13 it is 
possible to obtain expressions for the post-deregulation probability of 
failure and expected payout which depend on k,, p , A, B, and Q. 
1 X^Xg 
That is, functions which depend on: the riskiness of the assets as 
represented by and the correlation of the losses as approximated 
by p , the original size of the portfolio, A, the buffer, B, which 
*1*2 
gives the maximum capital value at the end of the period, 
(i.e., A*-D^), and the proportion of each asset In the portfolio, Q. 
D. Analysis of Risk Changes 
Given parameter values, the model allows a calculation of the 
probability of failure and expected FDIC payout after geographical 
deregulation for a representative bank. However, as previously 
indicated, in order to analyze the impact such deregulation has on the 
riskiness of banks, a comparison is needed between pre- and 
post-deregulation results. This is accomplished by assuming that 
before deregulation banks lend to only one geographic region. This 
results in the analysis being conducted on losses on loans to that 
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region. Specifically, the model will continue to assume that these 
losses are distributed as a truncated normal. However, now the losses 
are distributed as a univariate truncated normal. 
Following the transformation procedures and method of parameter 
specification from the previous section, the probability of failure for 
a representative bank before deregulation is 
%j(l^)dl^ li>0 (2.30) 
where j(l^) is the density function for 
a truncated normal distribution. 
Also, the expected payout by the FDIC is 
C y(0)j(l^)dlj + / (1^-A*+D^)j(l^)dl^. (2.31) 
Comparison of the results from equations 2.30 and 2.31 with the 
results obtained from 2.12 and 2.13 will allow an understanding of how 
interstate bank deregulation will affect the riskiness of a 
representative bank. Note, this riskiness is being approximated by the 
bank's probability of failure and the expected payout by the FDIC. 
Furthermore, examination of the sensitivity of these results to the 
correlation of the loan losses in different regions, the underlying 
riskiness of the loans, and the bank's capitalization rate can provide 
insights into potential policy decisions to be discussed In the final 
chapter. 
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In addition to these findings, certain assumptions can be made 
which will allow the results to indicate the potential changes in 
systemic risk that result from a modification in the regulation 
framework. Systemic risk can be measured in various ways. One 
possibility is to look at the probability of a^ bank failure in the 
banking system. Another option is to determine the probability of more 
than one bank failing at a given time. This is the problem of multiple 
bank failures. Finally, systemic risk could be measured as the total 
expected FDIC payout. 
The present model allows the probability of a^ bank failure and the 
probability of multiple failures to be analyzed if the assumption is 
made that losses on loans to different regions are independent. This 
assumption allows the conditional probability function to be specified. 
Also, if the assumption that after deregulation banks are identical to 
one another is made, an extreme case can be analyzed. 
From these assumptions, the pre-inters tate deregulation 
probability of multiple failures in the system is given by the 
probability that banks H and T fail. That is, 
Pr(H^nTj) - Pr(Hj|Tj)Pr(Tj) (2.32) 
where the subscript f indicates failure. 
Recall, that if loan losses are independent, then the probability that 
H fails given T fails is simply the probability of H failing. Thus, 
Pr(H^nTj) » Pr(Hj)Pr(Tf). (2.33) 
The probability that £ bank fails is given by the probability that H or 
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T fails. That is, 
Pr(H^ U Tf)- Pr(Hj)+Pr(T^)-Pr(Hfn T^). (2.34) 
From equation 2.33, this becomes, 
Pr(HgU Tg)= Pr(Hg)+ Pr(Tg)- Pr(Hf)Pr(Tf). (2.35) 
Finally, the total expected FDIC payout is simply the sum of random 
variables. Specifically, it is 
E(Payout^gyg^g^^). E(Payoutjj) + E(Payoutj.). (2.36) 
For the special case when banks are identical after deregulation, the 
probability of multiple failures is equal to the probability that any 
one bank falls. Thus, the probability of multiple failures is equal to 
the probability of a^ failure, both of which are equal to the 
probability of a representative bank falling. Symbolically, this Is 
Pr(H^OT^) - Pr(HgWTg) - Pr(H^) » Pr(T^). (2.37) 
Calculation of the expected FDIC payout is still given by equation 
2.36. 
In the next chapter, a simulation exercise will be conducted. 
Using various parameter values, the issues suggested in this chapter 
can be addressed. The results of these simulations can then be used in 
the policy implications to be discussed in the final chapter. 
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III. SIMULATION EXERCISES 
A. Introductloa 
The model developed in Chapter 2 provides a framework within which 
to analyze the Impact of geographical deregulation. Specifically, it 
allows an investigation of how bank riskiness might be affected by such 
deregulation. Recall that riskiness is being approximated by the 
probability of a representative bank failing and the expected payout by 
the FDIC in the event of a failure. 
As was suggested in section D of the previous chapter, in order to 
use the model, certain parameter values need to be specified. These 
parameters will allow a characterization of the environment in which 
the bank operates and the decisions made by the bank. A more general 
discussion of these parameters will be developed in the next section. 
Before proceeding, however, it is Important to clarify why a 
simulation exercise was conducted in place of a purely analytic 
solution. Note that the questions being asked could be addressed 
analytically by differentiating the equations for the probability of 
failure and expected FDIC payout, equations 2.12 and 2.13 respectively, 
with respect to the various parameters. However, this would entail 
differentiating an integral for which there is no apparent closed form 
solution. Thus, analytic solutions seem intractable if a realistic 
distribution is employed. 
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Faced with this predicament, a comparable approach can be used. 
That Is, rather than differentiating the functions, equations 2.12 and 
2.13 can be evaluated at different values of the parameters. The 
results of these exercises can then be compared. This will provide 
Information as to how the functions behave under different conditions. 
Effectively, it allows an understanding of how the results change as 
parameters change. This, in essence, is the information a derivative 
provides. 
In order to derive the desired values, at various parameter 
settings, an algorithm needed to be used which could approximate the 
appropriate volume under the functions. The procedure employed was a 
modified version of the Romberg Algorithm (9, p. 206). This algorithm 
uses a trapezoidal rule (33) to estimate the value of the integral. 
When the width of the trapezoid is set sufficiently small, the sum of 
the trapezoidal areas will approximate the Integral. The algorithm 
needed to be modified In order to account for the fact that the current 
analysis involves a double integral. This was accomplished by dividing 
the 1^ axis into subintervals. The estimation procedure was then 
applied for each value of l^ to approximate the area under the function 
for each individual 1^. Each Incremental result was multiplied by the 
Interval width. When the Interval width is small, this value will 
approximate the volume of the function for the given Interval. These 
incremental volumes were then summed to determine the total volume 
outside the buffer. 
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B. The Parameter Selection 
The parameters necessary to use the framework developed in Chapter 
2 can be grouped into two categories, environmental parameters and 
choice parameters. Enviromental parameters characterize the world in 
which the bank operates. In this model, these include the lambdas, 
kappas, and rho. The lambdas and the kappas give the mean and standard 
deviation of x per dollar of loans, where x is a variable with a full 
normal distribution. Given that the distribution on loan losses is 
derived from the truncation of this distribution then X and k also 
influence the mean and standard deviation of losses. Thus, they 
characterize the potential losses on the assets available to the bank. 
Similarly, the correlation of the x s influences the correlation of 
losses and hence the potential interaction of portfolio choices. 
Two criteria seemed appropriate in selecting the environmental 
parameters. First, the parameters needed to generate loan loss 
characteristics which were consistent with observed phenomena. 
However, as noted beforej individual bank loan default data have only 
been publlcally available for a relatively short time period. In 
addition, no data were available on loan collection expenses for 
individual banks. Thus, data on loan losses as defined in the model 
were not accessible, and this criterion was impossible to satisfy. The 
second criterion appropriate for determining environmental parameters 
was that the parameters should have a wide enough range such that the 
results would be robust. This allows the results to be relevant for 
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analyzing most bank loan loss experiences. 
Choice parameters are those factors that are Influenced by the 
decisions of the bank. These include: the portfolio size. A, the 
buffer, B, and the proportions of asset 1 and 2 in the portfolio, 1-Q 
and Q respectively. While the portfolio size could take on any 
positive value selected by the bank, subject to balance sheet and 
market constraints, all of the simulations were conducted with a 
portfolio size equal to 1. Thus, the results for the expected payout 
can be scaled up to the desired representative bank size. Conversely, 
the results presented in the tables indicate the expected payout per 
dollar of assets. 
The buffer represents the maximum value that capital at the end of 
the period can achieve. It reflects the combination of capital at the 
beginning of the period and the contractual return on assets. The 
choice of the appropriate buffer was guided by historical bank 
capitalization rates (43). However, as with the environmental 
parameters, the buffer was allowed to vary to «nhançe the robustness of 
the results. 
The proportions of the two assets in the portfolio, 1-Q and Q 
respectively, are determined by the bank's optimization procedure. In 
the simulation exercises, these parameters were allowed to take on a 
wide range of values. This facilitated the analysis of the impact of 
various portfolio combinations on bank riskiness. 
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C. Results 
1. Risk, changes for a represeatatlve bank 
The results of the simulation exercises are reported in Tables 3.1 
through 3.8. The discussion that follows will analyze these results. 
Table 3.1 gives the results of the simulation exercise conducted 
within the pre-deregulation framework. Recall that in this 
environment, banks lend to only one region. The results reported here 
can be used for comparisons with the results from the exercises carried 
out within the post-deregulation model. In a post-deregulation world, 
banks can hold loans made to both regions. 
The numbers from the regulated environment produce some 
intuitively pleasing results. First, one would expect that the larger 
the buffer, all else held constant, the lower the probability of 
failure and the lower the expected payout by the FDIC. Note that the 
buffer represents the bank's first line of defense against loan losses. 
A comparison of columns 1 and 2 in the first set of rows in Table 3.1 
substantiates this expectation. In both columns, the mean of loan 
losses is 2.78 cents per dollar of loans, and the standard deviation is 
.0213. However, in column 1 where the buffer is 8 cents per dollar of 
assets, the probability of a bank failing is .0226, but in column 2 
where the buffer is 9 cents per dollar of assets, this probability 
falls to .0131. Similarly, the expected payout by the FDIC falls from 
.0262 cents per dollar of assets to .0101 cents per dollar. A 
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comparable result can be obtained by comparing columns 3 and 4 in the 
top half of the table. Again, as the buffer rises from 8 cents per 
dollar to 9 cents per dollar of assets, the probability of a failure 
and the expected payout by the FDIC decline. 
Second, one might expect that riskier assets would generate a 
higher probability of failure and a higher expected payout. A riskier 
asset is usually considered to be one with either a higher mean loss 
value or a larger standard deviation of losses or both.^  For 
simulation purposes, these larger means and standard deviations can be 
generated by a larger k, a larger or a combination of the two. A 
comparison within columns 1 through 4 supports the expectation. 
Observe that in column 1, as the mean of loan losses rises from 2.78 
cents per dollar of assets to 3.97 cents per dollar, and the standard 
deviation goes from .0213 to .0304, the probability of failure rises 
from .0226 to .111. A corresponding increase is found in the expected 
FDIC payout. It rises from .0262 cents per dollar to .229 cents per 
dollar. Similar results can be noted in columns 2, 3, and 4. 
Furthermore, observe from column 3 in the bottom half of the table that 
among the values considered the largest probability of failure and 
expected payout la obtained when the mean and standard deviation of 
1 
However, as can be seen in the Appendix, this classlficatioa 
is not always appropriate. Its applicability depends on the 
distributional assumption made. 
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Table 3.1. Simulation results for a representative bank in a 
regulated environment under different assumptions 
about the mean and standard deviation of loan 
losses, and the bank's capital buffer 
A»1 
lambda*0.0 lambda=0. 01 
B-.08 B-.09 B».08 B-.09 
k».035 
mean of 1 
std. dev. 1 
Prob. Failure 
E(Payout) 
.0278 
.0213 
.0226 
.000262 
.0278 
.0213 
.0131 
.000109 
.0318 
.0231 
.0377. 
.0004775 
.0318 
.0231 
.0185 
.000214 
k=.05 
mean of 1 
std. dev. 1 
Prob. Failure 
E(Payout) 
.0397 
.0304 
.111 
.00229 
.0397 
.0304 
.07275 
.0014 
.0436 
.0322 
.14 
.00312 
.0436 
.0322 
.0956 
.002 
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losses are both at their maximum values, and the buffer is at its 
smallest value. 
For the first set of simulations on the deregulated environment 
(those with results presented in Tables 3.2 through 3.4), the 
characteristics of the loan losses in the two regions are assumed to be 
the same. That is, the mean of losses per dollar of loans in region 1 
will be assumed to be the same as the mean of losses per dollar of 
loans in region 2. Similarly, the standard deviation of losses per 
dollar of loans in region 1 will be assumed to be the same as the 
7 
standard deviation of losses per dollar of loans in region 2. Making 
such an assumption will allow our attention to focus on how changes in 
asset proportions and correlations affect the riskiness of banks, 
without having the results be influenced by differences in the means 
and standard deviations of losses in the two regions. 
Note that in Tables 3.2 through 3.4 the results of the simulations 
are only presented for Q equal to .3, .4, and .5. However, when the 
mean and standard deviation of losses per dollar of loans are the same 
2 This would suggest that when Q is equal to .5 (i.e., equal 
proportions invested in the two assets), the mean of losses in region 1 
should be the same as the mean of losses in region 2. Also, the 
standard deviation of losses in the two regions should be the same. 
However, nota from Table 3.2 that these figures are not precisely the 
same. Since these values were computed by the simulation program, any 
difference in the reported numbers is due to rounding error. This 
error is generated by the necessity of the simulation program to 
approximate the area under the integral. 
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in the two regions, the probability of failure and the expected payout 
by the FDIC for Q equal to .3 is the same as for Q equal to .7. 
Similarly, the results for Q equal to .4 correspond to Q equal to .6. 
Thus, a broader range of results are Implicitly presented. 
Table 3.2 shows how the riskiness of a representative bank in a 
deregulated world changes as the buffer and portfolio proportions 
change. The environment is characterized by losses in the two regions 
being independent. Also, as stated above, the mean and the standard 
deviation of losses per dollar of loans are assumed equal in the two 
regions. Consistent with the results in the pre-deregulated world, a 
comparison of the values for the probability of failure and the 
expected FDIC payout for each Q in column 1 with those in column 2, 
shows that a larger buffer reduces each of these risk measures. 
Similar results can be observed by comparing these two measures of risk 
for each portfolio in column 3 with the corresponding one in column 4. 
Furthermore, comparing the values for the probability of failure and 
the expected FDIC payout in column 1 with those in column 3, 
demonstrates that the combination of a larger mean and standard 
3 
This section investigates hypothetical portfolio combinations 
for an Individual bank. The next section will introduce the systemic 
constraint that when there are 2 or more banks in the system, and the 
total pool of loans are fixed, one bank's portfolio decision implies 
the other bank''s portfolio proportions. Thus, the term representative 
bank does not necessarily mean the average bank, and Q is allowed to 
take on values other than .5. 
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Table 3.2. Simulation results for a representative bank in a 
deregulated environment where losses between regions are 
uncorrelated, and the buffer, the portfolio proportions, 
and the mean of x are allowed to vary 
A-1 k(i)-.035 plx(l), x(2)l»0 pll(l), 1(2)1=0 
lambda=0 lambda».01 
B=.08 B-.09 B».08 B=.09 
mean of 1(1) .019136 .019136 .0221 
std. dev. 1(1) .0153 .0153 .0165 
mean of 1(2) .00835 .00835 .0095 
std. dev. 1(2) .00634 .00634 .0069 
Prob. Failure .00528 .00148 .0115 
E(payout) .000034 .0000087 .000085 
Q=.4 
mean of 1(1) .0164 .0164 .0191 .0191 
std. dev. 1(1) .01311 .01311 .0138 .0138 
mean of 1(2) .0111 .0111 .0126 .0126 
std. dev. 1(2) .00845 .00845 .00942 .00942 
Prob. Failure .00321 .00077 .00773 .0021 
E(?ayout) .000019 .0000041 .000052 .000013 
mean of 1(1) .01366 .01366 .01578 .01578 
std. dev. 1(1) .0109 .0109 .01178 .01178 
mean of 1(2) .01391 .01391 .0159 .0159 
std. dev. 1(2) .0106 .0106 .01149 .01149 
Prob. Failure .00258 .000586 .0065 .0017 
E(Payout) .000015 .0000031 .000043 .000010 
.0221 
.0165 
.0095 
.0069 
.00365 
.000024 
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deviation of losses per dollar of loans, all else held constant, 
generates a higher probability of failure and a higher expected payout. 
This finding is also supported by a similar comparison between columns 
2 and 4. 
Within each column of Table 3.2 it can be seen that there is an 
optimal portfolio from the regulators perspective. That is, there is a 
portfolio which generates a minimum probability of failure and expected 
payout. Among the alternatives evaluated in this example, it is the 
portfolio of Q equal to .5 which is optimal. This suggests that the 
regulators would prefer to have the banks in this environment hold an 
equal amount of each type of loan in their portfolios. 
However, regardless of the portfolio chosen, comparing the results 
in Table 3.2 for each lambda and buffer with corresponding ones from 
the top half of Table 3.1 shows that geographic deregulation will 
reduce the probability of failure and the expected payout by the FDIC 
for a representative bank. For example, if under deregulation the bank 
is in an environment where lambda is equal to 0, it has a buffer of 
.08, and it selects a portfolio of 70% in asset 1 and 30% in asset 2 
(i.e., Q".3), the bank has a probability of failure equal to .00328. 
This can be contrasted to a probability of failure in the regulated 
environment equal to .0226. Also, the expected payout per dollar of 
loans falls from .000262 to .000034. Using the respective value from 
the regulated environment as the base, these translate into a 76% 
reduction in the probability of failure and an 87% reduction in the 
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expected payout by the FDIC. 
Table 3.3 continues the results from a simulation where the mean 
and standard deviation of losses per dollar of loans are assumed to be 
equal in the two regions. The changing parameters reflected in this 
table are the correlation of the losses and the composition of the 
portfolio. The correlation of the x s are allowed to take values -.7, 
0, and +.7. These correspond to correlations for losses of -.177, 0, 
and +.466 respectively. 
Results in this table suggest that a lower probability of failure 
and expected FDIC payout can be obtained as the correlation of losses 
to the regions gets algebraically smaller. This can be seen by 
comparing the results among columns 1, 2, and 3 for any given Q. In 
addition, the lowest value for the probability of failure and the 
expected payout by the FDIC Is achieved when the losses are negatively 
correlated and a portfolio of equal proportions of the two assets is 
held by the bank. 
Table 3.4 differs from Table 3.3 in that lambda is now equal to 
.01 which generates a mean and standard deviation of losses per dollar 
of loans that are greater in Table 3.4 than in Table 3.3. Also, while 
the correlation of the x's are still -.7, 0, and +.7, the corresponding 
correlation of losses are now -.233, 0, and +.3 respectively. 
Comparing Table 3.3 with 3.4 suggests that regardless of the 
correlation of losses or the proportions of the assets held in the 
portfolio, the probability of bank failure and the expected FDIC payout 
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Table 3.3. Simulation results for a representstive bank in a 
deregulated environment where lambda equals 0, the regions 
have the same mean and standard deviation of losses per 
dollar of loans, and the portfolio proportions and 
correlation of loan losses are allowed to vary 
A«1 B-.08 laobda*0 k(i)=.035 
plx(l), x(2)] -.7 0 .7 
p[l(l), 1(2)1 -.177 0 .466 
mean of 1(1) .011 .019136 .02215 
std. dev. 1(1) .0092 .0153 .0156 
mean of 1(2) .0055 .00835 .0095 
std. dev. 1(2) .0045 .00634 .0066 
Prob. Failure 1.2 X 10", .00528 .02025 
E(Payout) 2.05 X 10"^ " .000034 .0002 
Q='4 
mean of 1(1) .0098 .0164 .019 
std. dev. 1(1) .008 .01311 .0134 
mean of 1(2) .0066 .0111 .0127 
std. dev. 1(2) .0054 .00845 .00875 
Prob. Failure 2 X lO", .00321 .0187 
E(ra-/out) 3.7 X lO" ^  ,000019 .000104 
Q='5 
mean of 1(1) .00816 .01366 ,0158 
std. dev. 1(1) .0068 .0109 .0114 
mean of 1(2) .00817 .01391 .0158 
std. dev. 1(2) .0068 .0106 .0113 
Prob. Failure 1.09 X 10"° .00258 .0181 
E(Payout) 2.17 X lO"^ '" .000015 .000181 
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Table 3.4. Simulation results for a representative bank in a 
deregulated environment, where lambda equals .01, 
the regions have the same mean and standard deviation of 
losses per dollar of loans, and the portfolio proportions 
and correlation of loan losses are allowed to vary 
A=1 B».08 lambda*0.01 k(l)=.035 
plx(l), x(2)] -.7 0 .7 
p[l(l), 1(2)1 -.233 0 .5 
9lll 
mean of 1(1) 
std. dev. 1(1) 
mean of 1(2) 
std. dev. 1(2) 
Prob. Failure 
E(Payout) 
.0148 
.0114 
.0064 
.0049 
.0000055 
1.05 X 10"® 
.0221 
.0165 
.0095 
.0069 
.0115 
.000085 
.02477 
.0166 
.0106 
.0071 
.0342 
.00037 
Q=.4 
mean of 1(1) .0127 .0191 .0212 
std. dev. 1(1) .0098 .0138 .01422 
mean of 1(2) .0085 .0126 .0142 
std. dev. 1(2) .0065 .00942 .00947 
Prob. Failure 5.24 X 10"; .00773 .0321 
£(Payout) 1.1 X 10-9 .000052 .00035 
Sill 
mean of 1(1) .0106 .01578 .0177 
std. dev. 1(1) .00815 .01178 .0119 
mean of 1(2) .0106 .0159 .0177 
std. dev. 1(2) .0081 .01149 .0117 
Prob. Failure 3.44 X 10"; 
7.8 X 10"10 
.0065 .0313 
E(Payout) .000043 .00034 
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is always less in Table 3.3 than in the comparable cell of Table 3.4. 
This Implies that the greater the mean and standard deviation of 
losses, the riskier the bank. 
Both Table 3.3 and 3.4 can be used to support the notion that 
geographic deregulation reduces the riskiness of banks. This can be 
seen if the results of these tables are contrasted with those from the 
top half of columns 1 and 3 in Table 3.1. Observe that, even when 
assets are positively correlated, as long as the correlation is less 
than 1, a reduction in the probability of failure and expected FDIC 
payout can be achieved by geographic deregulation. For example, the 
third column of Table 3.4 shows that when losses are positively 
correlated and the bank selects a portfolio of equal proportion in the 
two assets (i.e., Q*.5), the probability of a bank failing is .0313. 
The corresponding probability of failure for the bank in a regulated 
environment where it lends to only one region is .0377. Thus, 
deregulation could generate up to a 17% reduction in the probability of 
failure. Similarly, the expected payout by the FDIC would fall from 
.048 cents per dollar of assets to .034 cents per dollar, a decrease of 
29%. 
The distinguishing feature of Tables 3.5 and 3.6 is that the mean 
and the standard deviation of losses per dollar of loans are now 
assumed to be different in the two regions. Table 3.5 differs from 3.6 
in that in Table 3.5 lambda is 0, and the correlation of loan losses 
are -.177, 0, and .466, but in Table 3.6 lambda is .01, and the 
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Table 3.5. Simulation results for a representative bank in a 
deregulated environment where lambda equals 0, the mean 
and standard deviation of loan losses are different 
in the two regions, and the portfolio proportions and 
the correlation of losses are allowed to vary 
A«1 B*.08 lambda'O k(l)".05 k(2)>.035 
plx(l), x(2)] -.7 0 .7 
plUl), 1(2)] -.177 0 .466 
mean of 1(1) .0156 .0273 .0316 
std. dev. 1(1) .013 .0219 .0223 
mean of 1(2) .00546 .00835 .0095 
std. dev. 1(2) .00446 .0063 .0066 
Prob. Failure .00057 .0467 .0874 
E(Payout) .0000032 .00055 .00135 
Q=.5 
mean of 1(1) .01166 .0195 .0226 
std. dev. 1(1) .00977 .0156 .0159 
mean of 1(2) .0083 .014 .01586 
std. dev. 1(2) .00676 .0106 .0109 
Prob. Failure .0000092 
2.7 X 10"® 
.0180 .0575 
E(Payout) .00015 .00079 
9^  
mean of 1(1) 
std. dev. 1(1) 
mean of 1(2) 
std. dev. 1(2) 
Prob. Failure 
E(Payout) 
.007 
.0059 
. .0116 
.0095 
.000005 
1.7 X 10 -8 
.0117 
.0094 
.0195 
.0148 
.0106 
.000086 
.0136 
.0096 
.0222 
.0153 
.03925 
.0005 
9^  
mean of 1(1) 
std. dev. 1(1) 
mean of 1(2) 
std. dev. 1(2) 
Prob. Failure 
E(Payout) 
.0046 
.0039 
.0132 
.0108 
.000033 
8.32 X 10-8 
.0078 
.0062 
.0223 
.017 
.0125 
.00011 
.009 
.0064 
.025 
.0175 
.0341 
.00025 
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Table 3.6. Simulation results for a representative bank in a 
deregulated environment where lambda equals .01, the 
mean and standard deviation of loan losses are different 
in the two regions, and the portfolio proportions and 
the correlation of losses are allowed to vary 
A=1 B=.08 lambda «.01 k(l)-.05 k(2)=.035 
p[x(l), x(2)] -.7 0 .7 
pll(l), 1(2)1 -.233 0 .5 
Sziil 
mean of 1(1) .0193 .0302 .0336 
std. dev. 1(1) .0151 .023 .0233 
mean of 1(2) .0068 .00954 .0107 
std. dev. 1(2) .00524 .0069 .00705 
Prob. Failure .0023 .06835 .113 
E(Payout) .000014 .000882 .0019 
Q».5 
mean of 1(1) .0144 .0216 .024 
std. dev. 1(1) .0113 .0165 .0166 
mean of 1(2) .0104 .016 .018 
std. dev. 1(2) .008 .0115 .012 
Prob. Failure .000075 .0316 .0811 
E(Payout) 2.45 X 10"' .00030 .00122 
Q=.7 
mean of 1(1) .0086 .013 .0144 
std. dev. 1(1) .00676 .0099 .01 
mean of 1(2) .0145 .022 .0251 
std. dev. 1(2) .011 .0161 .01645 
Prob. Failure .000044 .0208 .060 
E(Payout) 1.2 X 10"' .000187 .000826 
Q="8 
mean of 1(1) .00575 .0086 .0096 
std. dev. 1(1) .00451 .0066 .0068 
mean of 1(2) .01656 .0254 .0287 
std. dev. 1(2) .0127 .0184 .0188 
Prob. Failure .0002 .0234 .0536 
E(Payout) 5.7 X 10-7 .0002314 .000719 
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correlation of loan losses are -.233, 0, and .5. Note that in both 
tables Q now ranges from .3 to .8. In the previous tables, the results 
were only given for Q equal to .3, .4, and .5. However, as previously 
mentioned, when the mean and standard deviation of losses per dollar of 
loans are the same in the two regions, the probability of failure and 
the expected payout for Q equal to .3 is the same as for Q equal to .7. 
Thus, a broader range of results was implicitly presented. In the 
following tables, where the means and standard deviations are not the 
same in the two regions, this parallel relationship does not hold. 
Instead, it is necessary to explicitly allow Q to take the full range 
of values. 
The results in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 support the hypothesis that the 
lower the correlation coefficient of the losses, the lower is the 
probability of failure and the expected FDIC payout. In addition, 
comparing cells of 3.5 with corresponding ones in 3.6 supports the 
claim that the greater is lambda, the riskier is the bank. 
The optimal portfolio from society's perspective is no longer the 
one of equal proportions. Recall society would prefer the bank to hold 
the portfolio which generates the lowest probability of failure. Thus, 
the optimum portfolio is one where a larger proportion is held in the 
asset with the smaller mean and standard deviation of losses per dollar 
of loans. However, observe that the optimal portfolio is one with Q 
less than 1. Specifically, in this example, when losses are 
uncorrelated or negatively correlated, the optimum portfolio lies 
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between Q equal to .5 and .8. When losses are positively correlated, 
the optimum is with a Q greater than .7. However, comparing these 
results with those presented in Table 3.1 shows that the optimum 
portfolio is one with Q less than 1. This conclusion results from the 
fact that for each correlation coefficient, a lower probability of 
default and expected FDIC payout can be obtained by holding certain 
portfolios of loans to both regions. Thus, geographical deregulation 
provides the opportunity to reduce the riskiness of banks. 
It follows then that a comparison of Tables 3.5 and 3.6 with their 
respective counterparts in Table 3.1 strengthens a claim made by Blair 
and Heggestad (4). They argue that whether an individual bank becomes 
more or less risky after deregulation of asset restrictions depends on 
how the bank reoptimizes its portfolio. Note, in the current example, 
if the bank before deregulation had a buffer of .08, and was In a 
region where k was equal to .035 and lambda was equal to 0, its 
probability of failure was .0226 and the expected payout by the FDIC 
was .000262. After deregulation; if the losses between regions are 
independent and the bank selects a portfolio with Q equal to .3, the 
probability of failure rises to .0467 and the expected payout goes up 
to .00055. If it selects a portfolio with Q equal to .7, the 
probability of failure declines to .0106 and the expected payout 
declines to .000086. Thus, when the mean and standard deviation of 
losses per dollar of loans in the two regions are different, the effect 
of deregulation on the riskiness of a representative bank depends on 
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how the bank reoptimlzes Its portfolio. However, as suggested above, 
there do exist portfolios where the probability of failure and expected 
FDIC payout will decline. These results are stronger than those of 
Blair and Heggestad In that they show actual probability movements 
instead of upper bound movements. 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 allow explicit analysis of how changing the 
standard deviation of x per dollar of loans to a region affects the 
riskiness of the bank. Table 3.8 differs from 3.7 only in that the 
mean of x per dollar of loans is greater in Table 3.8. As might be 
expected, for any portfolio combination, the lower the standard 
deviation of losses per dollar of loans, the lower is the probability 
of failure and the expected FDIC payout. Also, all risk measures in 
Table 3.8 are greater than the risk measures for corresponding cells in 
Table 3.7. This Implies that greater mean loss values increase the 
riskiness of banks. Finally, comparing the results of columns 1 and 2 
of Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 with the corresponding ones from Table 3.1 
indicates that when the asan and standard deviation of losses per 
dollar of loans are the same in the two regions, then geographical 
deregulation reduces the probability of failure and expected FDIC 
payout. However, as was previously suggested, a comparison of column 3 
in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 with Table 3.1 indicates that when the means and 
the standard deviations of losses per dollar of loans to a region 
differ, the impact of deregulation on bank riskiness depends on the 
bank's reoptimization decision. 
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Table 3.7. Simulation results for a representative bank in a 
deregulated environment, where lambda equals 0, loan 
losses are uncorrelated, and the portfolio proportions 
and the standard deviation of x per dollar of loans 
are allowed to vary 
A»1 B=.08 lambda«0.0 p[x(l), x(2)J"0 p[l(l}, 1(2)]"0 
k(i)-.035 k(l)-.05 k(l)=.05 
k(2)-.035 
mean of 1(1) .019136 .0273 .0273 
std. dev. 1(1) .0153 .0219 .0219 
mean of 1(2) .00835 .0119 .00835 
std. dev. 1(2) .00634 .0091 .0063 
Prob. Failure .00528 .0635 .0467 
E(Payout) .000034 .00080 .00055 
mean of 1(1) .0164 .0234 .0236 
std. dev. 1(1) .01311 .0187 .01823 
mean of 1(2) .0111 .016 .01115 
std. dev. 1(2) .00845 .0121 .00844 
Prob. Failure .00321 .0526 .02821 
E(Payout) .000019 .00061 .00031 
Q=.5 
mean of 1(1) .01366 .0195 .0195 
std. dev. 1(1) .0109 .0156 .0156 
mean of 1(2) .01391 .0198 .014 
std. dev. 1(2) .0106 .0151 .0106 
Prob. Failure .00258 .0483 .0180 
E(Payout) .000015 .00054 .00015 
SlLl 
mean of 1(1) .00835 .0119 .0117 
std. dev. 1(1) ..00634 .0091 .0094 
mean of 1(2) .019136 .0273 .0195 
std. dev. 1(2) .0153 .0219 .0148 
Prob. Failure .00528 .0635 .0106 
E(Payout) .000034 .0008 .000086 
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Table 3.8. Simulation results for a representative bank in a 
deregulated environment, where lambda equals .01, 
loan losses are uncorrelated, and the standard 
deviation of x per dollar of loans and the 
portfolio proportions are allowed to vary 
A»1 B-.08 lambda-0.01 p[x(l), x(2)]«0 plKD, 1(2))=0 
k(i)-.035 k(i)».05 k(l)-.05 
k(2)-.035 
q=.3 
mean of 1(1) .0221 .0302 .0302 
std. dev. 1(1) .0165 .023 .023 
mean of 1(2) .0095 .0131 .0095 
std. dev. 1(2) .0069 ,0096 .0069 
Prob. Failure .0115 .0897 .06835 
E(Payout) .000085 .00125 .000882 
mean of 1(1). 0191 .0259 .026 
std. dev. 1(1) .0138 .01975 .0197 
mean of 1(2) .0126 .0175 .0127 
std. dev. 1(2) .00942 .0128 .0093 
Prob. Failure .00773 .0773 .0452 
E(Payout) .000052 .00098 .00054 
Q=.5 
mean of 1(1) .01578 .0216 .0216 
std. dev. 1(1) .01178 .01645 .0165 
mean of 1(2) .0159 .0218 .016 
std. dev. 1(2) .01149 .01601 .0115 
Prob. Failure .0065 .0723 .0316 
E(Payout) .000043 .00090 .00030 
Q-'7 
mean of 1(1) .0095 .0131 .013 
std. dev. 1(1) .0069 .0096 .0099 
mean of 1(2) .0221 .0302 .022 
std. dev. 1(2) .0165 .023 .0161 
Prob. Failure .0115 .0897 .0208 
E(Payout) .000085 .00125 .000187 
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2. Systemic risk changes 
The analysis In the previous section suggests that geographic 
deregulation can potentially reduce the probability of failure and the 
expected payout by the FDIC for a representative bank. As was 
suggested in Chapter 2, however, the question still remains as to how 
geographic deregulation will affect the riskiness of the banking 
system. Recall, it was stated that the notion of systemic risk could 
be approximated in three ways: the probability of a^  bank failure, the 
probability of multiple bank failures, or the total expected payout by 
the insuring agency. The question of systemic risk from the insuring 
agency's perspective is interesting because it might be argued that the 
agency already pools the risk of losses in the banking system. If so, 
geographic deregulation would have no affect on this measure of 
systemic risk. 
The model developed in Chapter 2 can be used to analyze the effect 
of geographic deregulation on the probability of a^  bank failure and the 
prouaulllty of multiple bank failures if two Assumptions are made. 
First, loan losses in different regions are assumed to be independent. 
This will allow a characterization of the conditional probability 
function. Second, post-deregulation banks are assumed to be identical 
to one another. This allows the results for a representative bank to 
reflect the condition of any bank in the system. While this is an 
extreme assumption, it does allow the analysis to be tractable. 
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The necessary formulas to compute the effect of geographic 
deregulation on these system-wide risk measures are given by equations 
2.32 and 2.34 from Chapter 2. These state that prior to deregulation, 
given the two assumptions stated above, the probability of a^  bank 
failure is equal to, 
Pr(H^ ) + Pr(Tj) - Pr(Hf)Pr(Tf) (2.34) 
and the probability of multiple bank failures is equal to, 
Pr(Hg)Pr(Tf). (2.32) 
Furthermore, after deregulation, the assumption that the banks are 
identical implies that the probability of a^  bank failure is equal to 
the probability of multiple bank failures. That is, if conditions lead 
one bank to fail, they lead all the banks to fail. Using the results 
from the simulation exercises, it is possible to determine the values 
for these systemic risk measures. The results of these computations 
are presented in Table 3.9. 
Observe that the table compares these risk measures under a wide 
spectrum of parameter settings. The last two columns show that for any 
set of lambdas, kappas, and buffer, deregulation can potentially reduce 
the probability of a^  bank failing in the system. Note, that each 
number under the column marked post (i.e., values for the deregulated 
environment), is smaller than its respective counterpart under the 
column marked pre. However, as was suggested in the previous section. 
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this result rests on the banks holding a certain portfolio. It is 
possible that the banks could select portfolios where the probability 
of _a bank failing rises. From equation 2.34, it can be seen that this 
condition could result if the banks select portfolios such that the sum 
of the probabilities of the two banks failing individually increased 
sufficiently to offset any increase in the Joint probability of the 
banks falling. This condition could occur only if the two regions have 
different means and standard deviations of losses per dollar of loans. 
If these parameters are the same in the two regions, section 1 of this 
chapter demonstrated that any diversified portfolio would reduce the 
probability of a representative bank failing. Hence, it is only when 
the means and standard deviations of loan losses per dollar of loans 
are different between regions that the banks portfolio selection could 
adversely influence the probability of a^  bank failing in the system. 
The effect of geographic deregulation on the probability of 
multiple bank failures is not as easily predicted. Note from equation 
2.31 that this probability depends on the interaction of two variables. 
Pr(H^ nT^ ) - Pr(Hg|Tg)Pr(T2) (2.31) 
One is the conditional probability of bank H failing given that bank T 
fails. The other is the unconditional probability that bank T fails. 
The assumption that post-deregulation banks are identical clearly 
increases the conditional probability of H failing given T fails. 
However, it was just reported that the probability of T failing 
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Table 3.9. A comparison of the systemic risk changes, as measured 
by the probability of single and multiple bank failures, 
that result from interstate deregulation 
A«1 Q».5 p[l(l), 1(2)]»0 
FAILURES FAILURE 
B k(l) X Pre Post Pre Post 
.08 .035 0 .00051 .00258 .04469 .00258 
.09 .035 0 .00017 .00059 .02603 .00059 
.08 .05 0 .01232 .0483 .2097 .0483 
.08 .05 .01 .0196 .0723 .2604 .0723 
.08 .035 .01 .00142 .0065 .074 .0065 
.09 .035 .01 .00034 .0115 .0336 .0115 
.08 .035 .05 0 .00025 .0180 .1311 .0180 
.08 .035 .05 .01 .00528 .0316 .1724 .0316 
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potentially declines. Thus, the product of these two components is not 
obvious. 
Contrasting columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.9, it can be seen that 
under the present scenario, the probability of multiple failures 
increases. However, this result hinges critically on the conditional 
probability rising sufficiently to offset the decline in the 
probability of bank T failing. Had a less stringent assumption about 
the similarity of post-deregulation banks been made, this outcome might 
be reversed. 
Finally, there arises the question of how geographic deregulation 
influences the total expected payout by the FDIC. Recall, it had been 
suggested earlier that one might argue that the FDIC already pools bank 
risk and therefore a re-structuring of portfolios would have no affect 
on the total expected payout. However, from Table 3.10 it can be seen 
that this is not the case. 
The column in Table 3.10 labeled pre gives the total expected 
payout by the FDIC under a regulated environment for various 
assumptions about the mean and standard deviation of losses per dollar 
of loans in each region. Recall that in a regulated environment, each 
bank lends to only one region, and thus Q is equal to one for bank H 
and is equal to zero to bank T. The last three columns of the table 
give the total expected payout by the FDIC in a deregulated environment 
for various assumptions about the correlation of loan losses and the 
portfolios selected by the banks. The current analysis assumes that 
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Table 3.10. A comparison of the systemic risk changes, as measured 
by the total expected payout by the FDIC, that result 
from Interstate deregulation 
A-J-l BJ-.08 
lambda^O 
£E® E221 
p[x(l), x(2)] -.7 0 .7 
k(i)=.035 
9^=1 .000524 
V V-5 4.34 X lO'^^ .00003 .000362 
Qh=.7 Q.p».3 4.1 X 10"^° .000068 .0004 
k(l)=.05 k(2)«.035 
Qj,=l .002552 
V 5.4 X lO"® .0003 .00158 
QH=«7 QT=.3 3.37 X loT* .000636 .00185 
lambda=.01 
k(1)=.035 
QH=1 QT.»0 .000955 
V 
1.5 X 10"9 .000086 .00068 
Qy=.7 Q.J,».3 2.1 X lO"® .00017 .00074 
k(l)-.05 k(2)-.035 
QH=I QX"0 .0036 
V V-5 4.9 X lO"^ .0006 .00244 
^••7 Qx"«3 .0000141 .0011 .0027 
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the banks are of equal size and that the total pool of loans is fixed. 
It then addresses the Issue of how a redistribution of this fixed pool 
influences the total expected payout. These assumptions necessitate 
that the sum of the Q's be equal to one. 
A comparison of any of the values in the last three columns of 
this table with their respective counterparts in the column marked pre 
(i.e., the regulated environment), suggests that deregulation will 
reduce the total expected payout by the FDIC. This result holds for 
each set of assumptions about the lambdas, kappas, rho, and the 
portfolio proportion, Q. 
In addition, the results highlight another interesting 
observation. Recall from section 1 of this chapter that when the mean 
and standard deviation of losses per dollar of loans were different 
between regions, the optimal portfolio for a representative bank from 
the regulators perspective was not one with an equal proportion in the 
two assets. Rather, it was one where the bank held a larger 
pcoporticûs ia the less risky assist? However, under the current 
restriction that the total pool of loans is fixed and the banks are of 
equal size, a lower total expected payout can be achieved with each 
bank holding portfolios of equal proportion. 
Observe that when A is .01, k^ is .05 and k2 is .035, the total 
expected payout by the FDIC when banks lend to only one region is equal 
to .0036. However, in a deregulated environment where losses on loans 
between regions are uncorrelated, and bank H holds 70% of its portfolio 
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In Loans to region 2 (i.e., Q^*.7), while bank T holds 30% of its 
portfolio in these loans (i.e., Q^*.3), the total expected payout falls 
to .0011. Thus, the actuarially sound fund would decline. 
In fact, from Table 3.6, it can be seen that the move to a 
deregulated environment, where is equal to .7, results in the 
expected payout by the FDIC to this bank becoming .000187. This is a 
decline from the expected payout of .0004775 to this bank in a 
regulated environment (see Table 3.1). Similarly, for bank T in the 
deregulated environment where is equal to .3, the expected payout by 
the FDIC is .000882. In the regulated environment, the expected payout 
to this bank was .00312. So, deregulation leads the FDIC to have a 
lower expected payout to each bank. 
However, an even larger decline in the total expected payout is 
possible if both banks hold an equal proportion of loans to each 
region. In the current example, the total expected payout falls to 
.0006. Hence, while the expected payout to bank H does not decline by 
as such (i0003 versus ,000187). the expected payout to bank T falls 
sufficiently (.0003 versus .000882) to lead to an overall decline in 
the FDIC total payout. 
Thus, while it is optimal (i.e., minimizes the probability of 
failure and expected FDIC payout for an individual bank) to have a 
representative bank hold a portfolio of unequal proportions in the two 
loans, the constraints that the total pool of loans is fixed and the 
banks are of equal size precludes each bank from achieving this 
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individual optimal position. Hence, from a system-wide perspective, if 
the goal is to minimize the total expected payout, it is advantageous 
to have each bank hold a less-than-optimal individual portfolio, in 
order to achieve an optimal systemic position. 
Careful interpretation of this observation is required. Realize 
that this conclusion is the direct result of holding the pool of loans 
fixed and the bank's sizes equal. In fact, over time, the pool of 
loans could change. This would allow each bank to achieve a position 
such that the portfolio generated the minimum expected payout by the 
FDIC for the indivdual bank, and also the minimum total expected 
payout. This could happen if the amount of loans to the less risky 
region increases while the amount to the riskier region declines. 
Thus, while in the short run, the optimal portfolio for a 
representative bank differs from the optimal for the system, in the 
longer run, these two portfolios are completely compatible. 
Further analysis can highlight the rationale for the initial 
finding that geographic deregulation reduces the necessary size of the 
insurance fund if the current fund is actuarially sound. Specifically, 
note that there are two conditions under which the pre- and 
post-deregulation total expected FDIC payout would be the same. One 
case is when banks have an infinite amount of capital. In this 
scenario, the probability of failure both before and after deregulation 
would be zero. Hence, the expected payout by the FDIC would be zero. 
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The second case Is when banks have no capital. In this situation, 
the reshuffling of assets would not affect the expected FDIC payout. 
This results from the fact that portfolio changes cannot reduce the 
probability of bank failure because in this case it is essentially 
equal to 1. Put differently, there is no private capital over which to 
spread the losses. Thus, all losses must be absorbed by the FDIC. 
When there is private capital, portfolio reoptlmization allows the loan 
losses to be more effectively spread over the existing capital before 
it is necessary for the FDIC to absorb losses. 
This section has demonstrated that geographic deregulation will 
affect system-wide risk measures differently. If the appropriate 
measure of risk is the probability of multiple failures, then 
deregulation will likely increase systemic risk. If the appropriate 
measure of systemic risk is the probability of a^ bank falling or the 
total expected payout by the FDIC, then deregulation will potentially 
reduce systemic risk. The next chapter will evaluate some of the 
policy Implications that follow from these systemic results and the 
results in section 1 on the risk changes for a representative bank. 
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IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. Introduction 
The results presented in Chapter 3 provide valuable information on 
the affect of geographical deregulation on the social riskiness of 
banks. The next section of this chapter will interpret the policy 
implications of these results. The third section will discuss the 
limitations of the model and the results. The fourth section will 
suggest some possible extensions to the research. Finally, the last 
section will summarize the research project. 
B. Policy Implications 
The implications of the results derived in Chapter 3 can be 
grouped into three categories: scope issues, efficiency issues, and 
stability issues. The scope implications deal with the issue of the 
appropriate range of geographical deregulation. This concern focuses 
on whether policy makers should allow regional pacts amoung coatiguôuâ 
states as are being advocated by various banking groups or instead 
should promote a complete breakdown of geographic barriers. 
The results in Chapter 3 suggest that the greatest reduction in 
the probability of a representative bank failing and in the expected 
payout by the FDIC could be achieved when losses on the loans in the 
portfolio are negatively correlated. It would seem probable that the 
greater the geographical distance between states, the less correlated 
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the losses will likely be. As an example, consider the losses on a 
portfolio of loans made to Iowa farmers and Florida citrus growers. It 
would seem that the losses on these two types of loans would be less 
correlated than those on loans made to Iowa farmers and Illinois 
farmers. Thus, from a social perspective, where society is concerned 
about the probability of a bank failure, it would be more advantageous 
to have Iowa and Florida banks merge rather than allow the merger 
between Iowa and Illinois banks. In a more general sense, this would 
tend to argue against regional compacts and argue in favor of a 
complete breakdown of geographical barriers. 
Coupled with this Implication is the suggestion for an appropriate 
FDIC guideline when selecting a merger partner for a failing bank. 
Rather than simply accepting the highest bid, the FDIC might give 
preferential treatment to banks from regions that are more negatively 
correlated with the region of the failing bank. This would offer the 
greatest potential for a reduction in the probability of failure and 
the êxpëcCêu pâycut by the FDIC for the newly-merged bank. 
The second implication that follows from the results of the 
simulations concerns the efficiency gains from geographical 
deregulation. Efficiency gains refer to the ability of the insuring 
agency to protect the safety of the banking system with a lower 
per-bank premium. Recall that the results in Table 3.10 suggested that 
the total expected payout by the FDIC will decline as geographic 
barriers are removed. This would imply that the necessary premiums to 
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maintain an actuarially sound fund would also decline. Thus, banks 
could divert those resources previously expended on premiums to more 
productive uses.^ 
The third policy implication that can be derived from the 
simulation results concerns overall banking stability. Note that the 
removal of geographic barriers will provide opportunities for banks to 
reduce their probability of failure. However, as banks begin holding 
portfolios of loans to various regions, the similarity of individual 
banks will grow. This Implies that events which trigger one bank to 
fall will likely set off many bank failures. Thus, as was argued in 
Chapter 3, while the probability of an individual bank failure 
declines, the probability of multiple bank failures will likely 
increase. If in fact regulators are concerned with the public's 
perception of bank safety, they may wish to allow more Individual bank 
failures and avoid the potential for multiple failures. The argument 
is that the public might accept Isolated failures as simply the 
competitive macket place at work. Hewevsr, the observation of many 
simultaneous failures may invoke public concern and encourage panics. 
Obviously, policy makers must weigh the benefits of an increase in 
individual bank safety against the potential harm that results from 
This argument holds If the comparison is made between two 
actuarially sound funds. If the fund prior to deregulation is not 
actuarially sound, then the actuarially sound fund after deregulation 
might not be smaller than the actual fund before deregulation. 
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widespread failures. 
C. Limitations 
There are three factors which can be identified as limiting the 
robustnees of the conclusions derived from this research. First, the 
necessity to assume the joint probability distribution on loan losses, 
rather than being able to determine the actual distribution, has 
important implications. While, as was suggested in Chapter 2, the 
selection of the truncated normal distribution should have made the 
analysis both realistic and tractable, it also influenced the final 
outcome. Had a different distribution been selected (e.g., the log 
2 
normal), the results might have been different. Therefore, since lack 
of appropriate data limited my ability to determine the actual 
distributional properties of loan losses, any application of these 
results must be conditional on the acceptance of the assumed 
distribution. 
A secoud factor iihich needs to be coasidersd in interpreting the 
results concerns the competitive changes that may occur with 
deregulation. Some would argue that the current restrictions on 
geographic expansion have created pockets of monopoly power for local 
In fact, simulations that were run with the assumption that 
loan losses were distributed as a bivariate lognormal led to 
conflicting results. The analysis in the Appendix helps to explain 
those findings. 
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institutions (16, 17). Once the geographic barriers are removed, 
competition will alter the decisions made by the local institutions. 
Namely, if an institution formerly selected safe assets in order to 
protect itself, it might now be forced to pursue more risky endeavors 
in an attempt to maintain its profitability. Thus, the characteristics 
of the assets which the bank holds may change from those in the 
regulated environment. Whether the benefits from geographic expansion 
will outweigh the detrimental effect of selecting riskier assets is an 
empirical question. Insights into this possibility however can be 
gained by comparing the results from a simulation in a safe environment 
(e.g., A*0 k=.035) with those from simulations on portfolios with more 
risky assets (e.g., A=.01 k-.05). The final outcome will still depend 
on the portfolio selected. However, it is possible that under these 
circumstances deregulation might not reduce the probability of failure 
or the expected payout by the FDIC. 
A third limiting factor which needs to be mentioned is that this 
research is static- That is. It compares the social riskiness of banks 
before and after deregulation. It does not trace out the time paths 
over which the change occurs. Drawing from the previous paragraph, the 
nature of the institutions might be radically different during the 
transition period as opposed to the end result. This model limits the 
comparison to only the beginning and end results. 
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D. Extensions 
Careful reflection suggests a few extensions which might be 
carried out on the current research. First, as more data become 
available, it would be advantageous to try to determine the actual 
distribution that loan losses follow. This would then make it possible 
to carry out comparable analysis on this distribution and eliminate the 
necessity of assuming the distributional properties for loan losses. 
Second, with these data it might also be beneficial to determine the 
actual correlation of loan losses between regions. This would provide 
valuable information to the regulatory agency charged with making 
decisions on mergers and geographic expansion. It may in fact 
influence the decision as to the appropriateness of deregulation since 
the correlation of the losses has an important influence on the amount 
of benefits that can be derived from deregulation. 
A third possible extension to this research is to apply a Roy's 
Safety First type model to the solvency of the FDIC. Note that the 
current research argues that the expected FDIC payout will potentially 
decline. If one were to compute the variance of the FDIC payout it 
would be possible to compare the upper bound on the probability of the 
FDIC fund going bankrupt before deregulation with the upper bound after 
deregulation. While the previous criticism that this approach only 
tells movements in the upper bound of the probability still applies, It 
might provide some interesting insights into possible future problems 
with the solvency of the fund. 
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E. Summary 
This research project Investigated the question of how geographic 
deregulation might affect the riskiness of the banking system. In 
Chapter 1, it was argued that the geographical constraints imposed by 
the McFadden Act are binding on small and medium size banks. 
Furthermore, it was noted that states or groups of states in this 
country have unique economic cycles and that these cycles influence 
bank loan performance. Finally, It was suggested that the variance of 
asset returns might not be the appropriate measure of risk from a 
social perspective. Rather, the probablltly of a bank falling and the 
necessary size of an insurance fund were offered as alternative 
measures of risk from society's viewpoint. Thus, it was found that 
portfolio theory in a mean-variance context would not provide the 
relevant answers and an alternative approach needed to be developed., 
Chapter 2 developed a simplified two bank, two asset model within 
which to analyze the risk changes that result from geographic 
uêrêgulaticn. The probabilistic framework that was suggested required 
specification of a distribution on loan losses and a characterization 
of the portfolios which banks hold. Furthermore, it specified the 
appropriate approach to Investigate risk changes at an individual bank, 
and the necesary assumptions to analyze systemic risk changes. 
Since no closed-form solution was available for the derivatives of 
the integral of the truncated bivariate normal density function assumed 
on loan losses, Chapter 3 documents the simulation exercises that were 
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conducted to determine the implications of deregulation. Using various 
specifications about the characteristics of the loan losses in the 
regions, the correlation of the losses, and the portfolio selected by 
the bank, the questions of changes in the probability of bank failure 
and the expected FDIC payouts were addressed. In addition, following 
the required assumptions stated in Chapter 2, systemic risk changes 
were analyzed. 
Chapter 4 then draws on the results of these simulations to 
suggest possible policy implications that follow from the research. 
Specifically, this chapter argues against regional pacts and in favor 
of a full breakdown of geographic barriers. However, it also raises 
the issue of a tradeoff between an increase in individual bank safety 
and the potential increase in the probability of multiple bank 
failures. Finally, it suggests that geographic deregulation should be 
beneficial to society since it can reduce the necessary size of the 
insurance fund. Recall, the size of the fund was suggested as an 
alteznstivc measure of risk from a social perspective. Chapter 4 
concludes by identifying the limitations of the model and suggesting 
some possible extensions to this research. 
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VII. APPENDIX: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHANGES IN THE 
VARIANCE AND THE PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT WITH A LOG NORMAL DISTRIBUTION 
Movements in the variance of a distribution and the probability of 
default are not always consistent with each other. An example of a 
distribution where this compatibility does not always hold is the log 
normal distribution. 
Borrowing from the framework developed in Chapter 2, define 
capital at the end of the period as 
^t+1 " A*-Dt-1. (A.l) 
Assume that losses, 1, are distributed log normally. Failure occurs 
when capital at the end of the period, C^^^, is less than or equal to 
zero. This event happens when losses, 1, are greater than the buffer, 
A*-D^. To provide an intuitive explanation for why an increase in the 
variance of losses does not imply a decrease in the probability of 
default when lôââês ate log noraally distributedj it is advantageous to 
convert the problem into one that can be analyzed in normal space. 
Observe, that a variable with a log normal distribution can be 
transformed into a variable with a normal distribution in the following 
manner. If, 
1 - e* (A.2) 
and I is log normally distributed, then x is normally distributed. 
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Thus, If failure occurs when losses are greater than the buffer, 
1 > A*-D^, (A.3) 
then equation A.3 can now be written as, 
e* > A*-D^. (A.4) 
However, this is equivalent to writing that failure occurs when, 
X  > ln(A*-D^), (A.5 )  
where x is a normally distributed variable. The probability of failure 
is found by determining the probability that x is greater than the log 
of the buffer* Graphically, this probability is given by the shaded 
area under the normal probability distribution function in Diagram A.l. 
Diagram A.l. The Probability of Default in Normal Space 
Aitchisoa and Brown (1) have shown that the mean and variance of a 
log normally distributed variable, 1, are related to the mean and 
variance of a normally distributed variable, x, in the following way. 
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U.6) 
and, 
^)(e^®x ^-1). (A.7) 
Solving these for the mean and variance of x as functions of the mean 
and variance of 1 yields 
- 21n(u^) - (l/2)ln(^^+e(^^°^"l))) (A.8) 
<r^ =• ln(tr^^ + - 21n(u^). (A.9) 
Note from equations A.8 and A.9 that a change in the variance of 
losses, 0*^^, while holding the mean of losses constant, will result in 
a change in both the mean and variance of x. Mathematically, this is 
expressed by taking the derivatives of equations A.8 and A.9 with 
respect to the variance of losses. These derivatives are given in 
equations A.10 and A.11. 
r 
du - 1 
—% = — 
dtf-/ 2 
d<r 
^2  ^  g21n(u^) 
< 0 
> 0 
(A.10) 
(A.ll) 
+ g21a(Ui)) 
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From equations A.10 and A.11, it can be seen that a change in the 
variance of losses results in the mean and variance of x moving in 
opposite directions. Specifically, a decrease in the variance of 
losses will increase the mean of x but will decrease the variance of x. 
The increase in the mean of x will raise the probability of failure 
(i.e., increase the area outside ln(A*-D^)), but the decrease in the 
variance of x will reduce this probability (i.e., reduce the area 
outside ln(A*-D^)). This can be seen graphically in Diagram A.2 which 
presents the former distribution on x with a mean of u^ and a variance 
of and the new distribution on x that results from a reduction in 
X  
the variance of losses. This new distribution has a mean equal to u^/ 
2 
which is greater than u^, and a variance of which is less than 
Diagram A.2. The affect on the probability of default of a change 
in the variance of losses. 
The two conflicting movements in the parameters of the 
distribution on x lead to ambiguity as to what happens to the 
probability of failure. The final outcome will hinge on the size of 
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the buffer, A*-D^. Thus, to assume that a reduction in variance 
reduces risk might be In error if risk is approximated by the 
probability of failure, and the appropriate distribution is the log 
normal. 
